>The Iraqi informant's German handlers say they had told U.S. officials that his information was 'not proven,' and were shocked when President Bush and Colin L. Powell used it in key prewar speeches.
>
>http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-curveball20nov20,0,1753730.story?coll=la-home-headlines

"Although lack of direct physical access to the source made vetting and vali-dating Curveball more difficult, it did not make it impossible. While Defense
HUMINT neglected its validation responsibilities, elements of the CIA’s DO
understood the necessity of validating Curveball’s information and made
efforts to do so; indeed, they found indications that caused them to have
doubts about Curveball’s reliability.733 The system nonetheless “broke down”
because of analysts’ strong conviction about the truth of Curveball’s informa-tion and because the DO’s concerns were not heard outside the DO."
WMD report page 160.

Much of the problem with information sharing was the result of Janet Reno and more specifically Jamie Gorelick at the DOJ during the Clinton Administration. They ruled that the CIA and FBI could not collaborate or share intelligence information. It is called the WALL.

Read the policy, then ask yourself how we ever stop any terrorists?

http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0506/chapter2.htm

"III. The wall between intelligence and criminal terrorism investigations

Introduction
This section summarizes the creation of the “wall” separating criminal and intelligence terrorism investigations in the Department of Justice. The wall began as a separation of intelligence investigators from contact with criminal prosecutors, and evolved to include a separation of FBI investigators working on intelligence investigations from investigators working on criminal investigations.

As discussed above, FBI terrorism investigations could be opened either as an intelligence investigation in which information was collected for the protection of national security, or as a criminal investigation to prevent a criminal act from occurring or to determine who was responsible for a completed criminal act. In the course of an intelligence investigation, information might be developed from searches or electronic surveillance obtained under FISA. That intelligence information also could be relevant to a potential or completed criminal act. However, concerns were raised that if intelligence investigators consulted with prosecutors about the intelligence information or provided the information to criminal investigators, this interaction could affect the prosecution by allowing defense counsel to argue that the government had misused the FISA statute and it also could affect the intelligence investigation’s ability to obtain or continue FISA searches or surveillances. As a result, procedural restrictions – a wall – were created to separate intelligence and criminal investigations. Although information could be “passed over the wall” – i.e., shared with criminal investigators – this occurred only subject to defined procedures. "

As a cop, I would hate to think I couldn't talk to a prosecutor while working a case. This is ludicrous. Another reason I was sooooo glad when slick left Camelot!