I think labelling Zarqawi "not a priority" skirts the issue. It skirts a lot of issues. You have oneil, clarke, and others saying that from day one of the admin it was iraq. You have the UK saying, after meeting w/ our US government counterparts, "But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." You have a drumbeat of sketchy intel being pushed forward while dissenting opinions being quashed. In that light, it made sense that yes the admin did have a valid target but elected not to go after it, and instead went into iraq.

In your post that i first replied to, you stated "The Sudan offered us Bin Laden in 1997 and Clinton declined." My reply quoted the 911 commission, saying "The Commission has found no credible evidence that this was so." My point was to clarify.



>Do you have ANY doubt a pre-emptive assassination of Bin Laden in 1997 would have been subject to raised eyebrows on the part of Mr Feingold and Mr Levin ?
>
>I don't think Zarqawi was a priority in 2002. Saddam was. Given that, the strategy made sense. I understand you question the wisdom of a preemptive strike on Saddam - fair enough, that case can be made. ( a case can certainly be made that not enough intelligent planning was done for what would happen afterward ) And logically if that is the case, a strike on Zarqawi then would have been a very good idea ( albeit I would guess those who opposed the Iraq war would have been equally opposed to such a violation of Iraq ( and Iran's ) territory. I think a lot of the opposition to policy in the area had as much to do with a knee-jerk problem with Bush as a measured analysis of the geopolitics. Again, that case can be made, too, but my biggest difficulty is with those ( I do not measure you among them ) who prior to 2002 didn't know Bernard Lewis from Jerry Lewis but when they saw a Michael Moore cartoon they were suddenly impassioned foreign policy experts.
>
>I don't think the commission said there were no feelers by Sudan intelligence to render Bin Laden. There was in fact no official profer. But in any case Bin Laden was a whole lot more accessible at that time than later in Afghanistan. My point was our government did not consider a pre-emptive strike against a sworn enemy as an option.
>
>Paraphrasing Golda Meir, I fear those who, if in control of our government, would have us commit suicide so the world will think well of us.
>
>>That is a lot of conjecture on your part as to what levin and feingold would do, and i do realize that your opinion is in contrast to the findings of the 911 commission... a commission (not without its own set of issues) that had subpoena power, who interviewed over 1200 people and reviewed over 2.5 million pages of documents, and could compel people to testify under oath (although in the case of George and Dick, they would only agree to testify if they could testify together and that they would not be under oath).
>>
>>I tend to agree w/ the article's statement that the reluctance to go after Zarqawi back in 2002 was due to "the administration feared destroying the terrorist camp in Iraq could undercut its case for war against Saddam". On a side note, that reluctance is a bit of a contradiction to the admin's preemption policy. But it does jive with those meeting minutes (marked SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY) transcribed during the British Prime Minister's meeting on July 23, 2002:
>>
>>But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
>>
>>But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.
>>
>>The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action.
>>
>>
>>
>>>Re attacking Zarqawi's camp prior to the Iraq war that would have probably been premature though I suspect the reluctance had as much to do with not revealing intelligence sources than fearing endangering the case for war.
>>>
>>>I agree the Sudan story varies depending who is telling it. I understand that the offer was not "official". I do consider the source of the unofficial profer reliable.
>>>
>>>But it is undisputed that while Bin Laden was in the Sudan, and during the window of opportunity when he was relocating, he was killable, if not indictable. I have no doubt that if Mossad thought Israel's survival depended on him being dead at that time he would have been so. Of course, any move to do so by an American intelligence agency would have induced in Carl Levin and Russ Feingold a serious case of the vapors and there would have been Congressional Inquiries ( provided they could be telivised ) and talk of rogue this and rogue that. And since this was all pre-9/11 ( and would have precluded 9/11 ) it would have been impossible to prove to anyone's satisfaction that it was necessary, appropriate, "legal" or appealing to the Harvard faculty.
>>>
>>>I have a rather contrarian notion of this sort of thing. When someone is, soi-disant, your blood-enemy - give him the courtesy of taking him seriously. If he has sworn death to you and yours consider this an abrogation of his right to a presumption of innocence.
>>>
>>>Shortly after 9/11 I was watching television with a friend from the old days. Palestinians were dancing in the streets shouting "Death to America". I asked him, "What do you call *that*!"
>>>
>>>He said, "A target-rich environment."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>>The Sudan offered us Bin Laden in 1997 and Clinton declined. I think Janet Reno told him we really couldn't convict him of anything. They thought of it as a legal problem.
>>>>
>>>>I agree that it was looked at as more of a legal issue, but the 911 commission "found no credible evidence" that "Sudan offered" and "Clinton declined".
>>>>
>>>>http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch4.htm
>>>>
>>>>Sudan's minister of defense, Fatih Erwa, has claimed that Sudan offered to hand Bin Ladin over to the United States. The Commission has found no credible evidence that this was so. Ambassador Carney had instructions only to push the Sudanese to expel Bin Ladin. Ambassador Carney had no legal basis to ask for more from the Sudanese since, at the time, there was no indictment out-standing.
>>>>
>>>>Finding examples of missed opportunities is an easy thing to do.
>>>>
>>>>http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4431601/
>>>>
>>>>... But NBC News has learned that long before the war the Bush administration had several chances to wipe out his terrorist operation and perhaps kill Zarqawi himself — but never pulled the trigger.
>>>>
>>>>... The Pentagon drew up a second strike plan, and the White House again killed it. By then the administration had set its course for war with Iraq.
>>>>
>>>>... The Pentagon drew up still another attack plan, and for the third time, the National Security Council killed it.
>>>>
>>>>Military officials insist their case for attacking Zarqawi’s operation was airtight, but the administration feared destroying the terrorist camp in Iraq could undercut its case for war against Saddam.
>>>>
>>>>http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/us-allowed-zarqawi-to-escape/2006/04/30/1146335608444.html