http://www.govexec.com/features/0606-15/0606-15s3.htm


>>"IRAQ: A STATUS REPORT" by AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD
>>Delivered July 11, 2006
>>http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2006/07/khalilzad-on-iraq.html
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>>If you're looking for some on the groud perspectives from Iraqis, I suggest "Iraq the Model". Omar and Mohammed offer a great perspective to the conflict.
>>http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com/
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>I'm not sure why we need an Iraq status report when we've got some well thought out policies in Bush's Nov 2005 "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" like: "Our mission in Iraq is to win the war. Our troops will return home when that mission is complete.", but the America-hating United States Government Accountablity Office weighed in on July 11 with "Rebuilding Iraq - More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Archieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges". http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06953t.pdf
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>Some highlights...
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>David M. Walker, the U.S. comptroller general, told lawmakers that President Bush did not give proper consideration to conditions on the ground and said the administration is not demanding accountability for the $1.5 billion per week that the United States spends in Iraq.
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>It is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired end-state in Iraq given the significant changes in the assumptions underlying the US strategy
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>The overall number of attacks increased by 23 percent from 2004 to 2005 and rose to the highest ever level of intensity last April, the investigators pointed out.
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>DOD publicly reported in May 2006 that the average number of weekly attacks was higher for the February to May 2006 time period than for any previous period.
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>In the absence of security efforts to rebuild the war-ravaged country or even to return key segments of its economy to their pre-war level have hit a roadblock.
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>If before the 2003 US-led invasion, crude oil production averaged in Iraq 2.6 million barrels a day, it stood at only two million barrels a day this past March, according to the report.
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>A combination of insurgent attacks on pipelines, dilapidated infrastructure and poor maintenance have hindered domestic refining and turned Iraq into an importer of liquefied gas, gasoline, kerosene and diesel fuel, the document said.
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>Water and sanitation projects, on which the United States spent about 52 million dollars, were inoperable or operating below capacity.
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>Investment has been reduced to a trickle. Last year, the report noted, the Iraqi government budgeted approximately five billion dollars for capital expenditures, but managed to spend only a few hundred million.
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>Generous foreign aid -- another hoped-for component of success in Iraq -- was never delivered in promised amounts.
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>While foreign donors had pledged about 13.6 billion dollars to rebuild Iraq, only 3.5 billion was actually provided as of last April, the GAO pointed out.
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>Meanwhile, it will take 30 billion dollars for the Iraqi oil industry to produce five million barrels a day -- and 20 billion to rebuild the electricity sector, the agency estimated.
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>All of these factors have prompted the GAO to issue a dire forecast: "Security, political, and economic factors will hamper US efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key US goals."
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>The November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and related supporting documents do not clearly identify the costs of US military operations, including the costs to repair and replace equipment used during operations. The strategy does not identify other key related costs, including the costs of training, equipping, and supporting Iraq's security forces; the costs of rebuilding, maintaining, and protecting critical oil and electricity infrastructure; or the costs of building managent capacity in IRaq's central ministries and 18 provincial governments.
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>US government agencies have reported significant costs associated with the global war on terror, which includes military operations in Iraq. However, we have serious concerns about the reliability of DOD's reported cost data. GAO's prior work found numerous problems with DOD's processes for recording and reporting GWOT costs, including longstanding deficiencies in DOD's financial mgt systems and business practices, the use of estimates instead of actual cost data, and the lack of supporting documentation. As a result, neither DOD nor Congress knows how much the war on terror is costing or how appropriated funds are being used.
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>Even as the number and capabilities of Iraqi security forces have increased, overall security conditions have detiorated, as evidenced by attack trends, sectarian vilence, and the growth and influence of militias. Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure have continued to increase over time.