>>>>>>>You can militarily defeat a nation amd if it is backed up with nation-building... things can work out. See Japan and Germany. The US nuked Japan and the US and Japan have a pretty cozy relationship now.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>Have you got a modern times example of an AGGRESSOR nation winning a war and then having a cozy relationship with the people vanquished?
>>>>>
>>>>>It is kind of interesting that you pose your question in a way that it is unanswerable since agressor nations would be less disposed to nation building.
>>>>
>>>>The question I posed is answerable, but at the expense of your statement (which I challenged by the question).
>>>
>>>Here it is The Philippine-American War. US was the agressor. Upon defeat of the Philipine army, the US proceeded to nation build, guide it to democracy and independence.
>>>
>>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines#History
>>
>>Hmmm, 2 sentences to cover 34 years. Who knows what went on during that time?
>>And what does it say about the state of the Philippines post-war? Maybe they were in a sorry state.
>>Finally, it was one occupier, then another. A little different than a free country occupied and "built". I also didn't see any mention of "nation building".
>>A weak example.
>
>I'll take that as your way of accepting that I've disproved your statement.

I was being polite.
Since the article says NOTHING about "nation building" I don't know how you can claim there was *any* such thing that went on there.
You had an original agressor (Spain), an agressor (U.S.), an interloper in the outcome of that agression (the self-declarer as ruler), a war with the interloper that lasted over a year and final domination by the U.S. there.

How do we know that the country wasn't a shambles after the wars?
How do we know that the U.S. did any kind of 'nation building'? After all, it took 30+ years for the "democracy' there to root.

Sorry, but no, it's not an example.
And here you had said, by the way, that my question was invalid and not answerable.

UPDATE: I came across this reading a link in another thread today. Later the same article said the Philippines war was one of several used to learn how NOT to do the job:
The Philippines. In the aftermath of the Spanish-
American War, the United States began a long occupation of
the Philippine Islands that officially ended with their
independence in 1946. This lengthy transition to selfgovernment
is not typical of American experiences with
occupation, and the most useful insights are to be gleaned
from the early years, when American forces were trying to
subdue resistance and establish control in the former
Spanish colony.
One aspect of post-conflict operations that becomes very
clear from the Philippines example is that they are
misnamed. To be successful, they need to begin before the
shooting stops. “Transition Operations” is probably a better
term, and they will be conducted simultaneously with
combat. Appropriate planning must be completed before the
conflict begins, so military forces are prepared to begin
immediately accomplishing transition tasks in newlycontrolled
areas. All soldiers will need to accept duties that
are typically considered in the purview of CA detachments.
There will not be enough CA troops to go around, and
immediate needs will have to be met by whomever is on the
scene. Even in the midst of combat, leaders and their
soldiers must keep in mind the long-term goals of peace and
stability, and conduct themselves accordingly.
In the Philippines, both military and civilian officials
recognized that the best agent for local pacification was the
military leader on the spot. Considerable decentralization
was required for a situation where village attitudes and
characteristics varied widely. Officers had great discretion
and were not closely supervised, though they also had clear
directives from higher headquarters providing guidelines.
The requirement for local familiarity meant that soldiers
could not be rotated quickly. In village societies personal
relationships are important, and take considerable time
and effort to establish. The Army had to accept some decline
in the combat efficiency of its units in order to keep them in
lengthy occupation duties. Troops had to be aware of the
cultures they were in, and not try to force American values.
Knowledge of the Koran and local customs were important
for everyone. Even John J. Pershing could spend hours
talking to local imams about religion. This does not lessen
the requirement to achieve the right balance of force and
restraint, but the long-term consequences must be
considered for every action. General Leonard Wood’s
predilection for punitive forays in response to even minor
incidents like theft did cow many Moro chiefs, but he also
undermined many alliances and relationships painstakingly
established by local commanders. Instead of
quieting small disturbances, Wood’s expeditions often
created larger problems by driving pacified or neutral
villages into joining more rebellious ones, and made it more
difficult for his subordinates to gain local trust.