But wasn't the report about what the intelligence really was able to support or not support, and the conclusion was that the intelligence at that time did not support the conclusions the administration was shoving down everyone's throats? And frankly, I think the report's conclusions were a bit overly kind to the administration, especially in light of later claims by some of the CIA that much of the intelligence analytics were driven by the administration and not by the evidence.

Also, keep in mind that just about the whole world outside of the U.S. and Britain believed, at the time, what the report later concluded.

So this idea of overwhelming necessity maybe was, even then, a little less than overwhelming.

>But that was my point. I stated at the time. The report you cite was not released until July 2004. Everyone sees it differently given the information we now have.
>
>
>>>Granted, before the Iraq war intelligence information presented an almost overwhelming necessity for our intervention there
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>>I disagree. The administration presented intelligence that made it seem necessary, but the Senate Committee on Pre-war intelligence has shown that the intelligence didn't support what the administration was claiming.
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>>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Senate_Report_of_Pre-war_Intelligence_on_Iraq#The_report.27s_conclusions