>>>There weren't any cases documented elsewhere but in SF, so where else? :). My point here is that any metempsychosis or upload or reincarnation without memory - method is irrelevant - doesn't count if there's not enough of the original person left after transfer to maintain the person. So if you get a different person as a result, it may be related to the original, but is substantially someone else.
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>>I think then we have a fundamental disconnect. You may upload your memories etc, but because you are uploading into (I presume) an already formed brain, then that brain has its own neural pathways.
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>But then how are you putting a new mind into that brain if the pathways are unchanged?
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>I think the paradigm we may be looking for is that there are still unused pathways where the new mind will go... so, something like "installing the same app into a different OS still needs disk space".

I see where you're going with this now. You want the upload to actually forge new neural paths. Does the uploading mind have that information, or does the upload software handle it?

I would expect more that the upload simply uploads data (ie memories, etc) into the receptacle brain, but that new paths would only be forged once the uploaded mind initialises and begins to run. Of course, any new paths forged would have to be intimately tied in to the concepts and interpretations of the already existing paths.

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>>Again, it would depend on the maturity of the neural networking already in place.
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>Maturity (amount of neural space already written into) and volatility (how much of it is rewritable). Since we don't know much about how this would work, our speculations can only be wild. In case of upload into a virtual body/space, I'd say Egan's "Permutation city" is a plausible model.

>>If you upload into a virtual body with no pathways in place, then you will be pretty much a vegetable. Or, if not that, then at least a newborn with memories but no ability to access or interpret those memories. Otherwise, my argument above gets trotted out again.
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>Or, in my case, a transfer would assume writing its own pathways (to some extent) or else we get translation loss.

Interesting concept - that the uploading software would be able to forge new pathways in the receiving brain such that those pathways would exactly mirror the pathways of the uploading brain. And that those new pathways would exacly mirror the attitudes and learned biases etc of the uploading pathways. Well, I think personally, you are going to get translation loss. I think it is probably inevitable. Are the already existing pathways in the receiving brain going to disappear at the same time as the new ones are being forged?

>>>The online version has only two meanings, which differ by generality only - a particular or a general system of thought. It's probably meant to not mean much to spectators with cheaper tickets.

>>The online Webster I was using has 4 definitions - unless you count 2a and 2b as separate definitions, in which case there are 5. I simply dismiss the first one as pointless:
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>>1 : of or relating to metaphysics
>>2 a : of or relating to the transcendent or to a reality beyond what is perceptible to the senses b : SUPERNATURAL
>>3 : highly abstract or abstruse; also : THEORETICAL
>>4 often capitalized : of or relating to poetry especially of the early 17th century that is highly intellectual and philosophical and marked by unconventional imagery
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>In case of the adjective, right - it's the noun where I'm sticking with the philosophical meaning.

When you say "metaphysical bookstore", how can 'metaphysical' be interpreted as a noun? The noun is 'metaphysics'. 'Metaphysical' is always an adjective as far as I can tell.

>>Now I've lost track of the score, but I think my Webster's trumps your Webster's for completeness, so I think I may have gained a point even if I don't know the scoring rules.
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>Never mind the score, we didn't set any rules yet :).

Ok. In that case, I'm waaaaaayyy ahead. ;)