>Leibniz says "space, time, matter (atoms) are illusions".
>
>His point is that physical Reality itself is an illusion. (Metaphysical Reality is what is actually real.)
>
>If he were alive today, I would ask him "If all of reality is an illusion, doesn't that mean illusion is an illusion?"
>
>Sort of makes you wonder how much these words actually mean.
>
>
>I prefer to think that atoms are real. Just as you and I are real.
>
>When we speak of monads, we have to switch to a different ontological and epistemological context: the square in figure a, rather than the circle.
>
>I would agree that monads are real, but only if we agree they are real in a different kind of way than atoms or you or I are real.
>
>Of course, that may be interesting to some but not to physicists.
>
>I think it can be made interesting by saying the same sort of thing but purely using mathematics.
>
>That's the aim of the steps described in my paper.

Different levels of reality are nice for virtual realities, movies like Existenz, or anything derived from Philip K Dick's novels - but for Leibnitz's monads I think we're talking about just another repackaged solipsism, with atomic structure applied to the mental/ideal space as well.

I thought you lost me when you dragged my attention into the code, with the dancing dots - which is nice, but it's just code. I can't see either code or maths as tools of expressing an idea unless the idea is about code or maths itself. IOW, wrong medium IMO.

But you actually lost me at the two images, the square and circle with words. I had absolutely no clue how are they related or not; what's the relation between the big word in the middle, the words in the upper part and the words below. While I could assume that these are set diagrams, and that the big words are the set names while small words are elements, this was dispelled by having "mind" a dozen times in the left one... why would you list the same element so many times? Ergo, these can't be sets. Then, on the right, the ideas above the word Reality seem to be concrete things, while those below seem to be abstract. But then "space", "time", "matter" - these could be abstract ideas, not concrete instances of these ideas. My room is a concrete instance of the idea of space, right? OK, even if we assume that abstract is below and concrete is above, if we turn to the left, there's now a concrete absolute space, time and matter on top, no concrete instances thereof in between, and some "mind" as what, just an abstract idea?