>>While I certainly agree protection is needed in some areas for IP of the app, the threat vector of somebody hacking a vfp.exe to infect a network is better avoided by offering secure / hash coded update packages on a protected server accessed by SSL at least. When hacker goes to work on vfp.exe the battle on network entry is already lost.

Working theory in latest healthcare hack/s is malware opened in somebody's email. When that happens, hackers presumably can access apps and anything else the user enjoys. If they get hold of an easily cracked app and can lift database credentials, now they can grab data for blackmail: pay or we upload these sensitive records to the public internet. This was threatened with both recent high-profile hacks.

IMHO anybody reading this will know their own risks; my own view is that "planning is preparing for the worst, not hoping for the best" and strong protection is very accessible in 2021. JMHO- and FWIW, I had forgotten if I ever knew that a VFP exe doesn't load fully into memory, as it's been decades since I willingly deployed such a thing.

For Dmitry, a useful time-saving consideration might be that if the whole app is memory-resident, that's the end of file read errors. ;-)