Yes, but your example of the keyboard is more a belief in subjectivism and not objectivism. In subjectivism you know the keyboard exists because you can see it and feel it. You can experience it for yourself. It's reality is based on your awareness of it. However, objectivism would state that the keyboard exists whether or not you can see it or even know of it based on the premise that keyboards are manufactured all around the world and thousands of people use them everyday which is independent of whether or not you do. Except that I think Rand only held this to be true for existence and the external world - that it exists independent of any individual's awareness of it.

Another of the problems I have with objectivism is the premise that the physical world is the one and only reality and man must conform only to its facts. Proven by his perception via his senses and then defined by logic only.

>>It is also the 'belief' that reality exists separate from any concious awareness of it. Or perhaps more accurately, independent of any awareness of it.
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>This is a very old idea that I wouldn't attribute to Rand.
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>The question is ontological. What is real?
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>Clearly Rand and I agree that there are two "realms": an objective reality and a conscious reality.
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>Ayn seems to think that "what is real" is the objective reality, but I find this counter intuitive. I'm looking at my keyboard right now. My concsious experience of the keyboard is what feels real to me, but according to objectivism what feels real to me is really a conscious manifestation of something more fundamental, and that something more fundamental is what is "real."
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>It seems more intuitive to say that whatever feels real is real, and the fundamental entities that aren't directly observed may as well be considered non-existent.
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>This terminology isn't an issue of any importance until we start to talk about physics. The principles of relativity and uncertainty describe what is observed in our conscious experience. Some would suggest that they describe reality, but obviouslly an objectivist wouldn't necessarily agree.
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>I think that its important to recognize that this terminology issue isn't critical to objectivism on the surface, but it reminds us of something deeper: that what we consider facts (assuming a fact is a codified statement that describes nature) really rest on layers and layers of assumptions, definitions, myths, and conjectures.
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>It is this realization that causes us to look a statement like "reality is an objective absolute, facts are facts" and say that this could be true if we agreed on the required assumptions and definitions. Thus in the process of making the statement true, we are really proving it false.
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>Does that make sense?