>I'll assume you've never read Woodward's stuff on this very issue. He can hardly be called a Bush apologist but both Bush at War and Plan of Attack are compelling reading. Woodward's sources are undisputedly first-rate.

I actually read the 5-part series in the Washington Post when it was first published:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19691-2004Apr17.html

At the very beginning of the story, there's something very telling:

The media reports of smiling Iraqis leading inspectors around, opening up buildings and saying, "See, there's nothing here," infuriated Bush, who then would read intelligence reports showing the Iraqis were moving and concealing things. It wasn't clear what was being moved, but it looked to Bush as if Hussein was about to fool the world again.

The administration had no idea what was being moved (an indication that maybe the intelligence isn't too strong), yet they automatically assume it was WMDs. This was an administration that already had it's mind made up, and saw what it wanted to see in the intelligence reports.

>Regarding the Middle East and the thinking behind the overall strategy there ( not the slogans or the bumper stickers but the real hard-nosed white paper stuff ) your pretty much need to read Kenneth Pollack, Pipes, Perle, Wolfowitz's own white papers, a whole lot of Bernard Lewis and a raft of other stuff. There are arguements to be made on both sides, but the slogans on either side are just blather. This stuff is a heck of a lot more complex than the most complex computer issue as human affairs have one heck of a lot more variables.

I assume you're referring to this Kenneth Pollack, Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200401/pollack

So far as Wolfowitz is concerned, his credibility is all but shot. This is the man who shortly after 9/11 said we should attack Iraq first, not Afghanistan. He also claimed we would be welcomed with flowers by the Iraqis, and both General Shenseki's and General White's testimony before Congress that we would need several hundred thousand troops for Iraq was crazy.

Is it complex? Yes. Was Wolfowitz right? Not even close.